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PANEL II:  Conflicts of Interest in 
Sports 
Moderator: John D. Feerick* 
Panelists: David Feher† 
 Craig E. Fenech‡ 
 Charles Grantham§ 
 Steven C. Krane|| 
 
* Dean, Fordham University School of Law, 1982–2002.  Partner, Skadden, Arps, 
Slate, Meagher & Flom, LLP, 1968–82; Associate, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & 
Flom, LLP, 1961–68.  Captain, Judge Advocate General’s Corps., U.S. Army, 1962–69.  
New York City Representative, New York City Office of Collective Bargaining, 1980–
87.  Chairman, New York State Commission on Government Integrity, 1978–90.  Special 
New York State Attorney General, 1987–90.  President, Association of the Bar of the 
City of New York, 1992–94.  Chair, New York State Committee to Review Audiovisual 
Coverage of Court Proceedings, 1996–97.  Chair, Standards Review Committee, 
American Bar Association [ABA] Section on Legal Education & Admissions to the Bar, 
1996–98.  Director, American Arbitration Association, 1998–2001.  Member, Task Force 
to Develop the Twenty-fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.  B.S., Fordham 
College, 1958; LL.B., Fordham University School of Law, 1961, LL.D. (Honorary), 
Fordham University School of Law, 2002. 
† Of Counsel, Weil, Gotshal & Manges, LLP.  Adjunct Professor of Law, Benjamin 
Cardozo School of Law.  Member, National Football League [NFL] Salary Cap Revenue 
Accounting Committee.  Member, NBA Salary Cap Revenue Accounting Committee.  
B.A., magna cum laude, Georgetown University, 1980; J.D., Duke University School of 
Law, 1984. 
‡ President, The Sparta Group.  Staff Attorney, IBM Corp., 1973–77.  Attorney, 
Federal Defenders of San Diego, Inc., 1977–80.  Director, Sports Lawyers Association.  
Co-chair, Sports Lawyers Association Committee on the Federal Regulation of Agents.  
Adjunct Professor of Law, Management Institute of New York University, 1955.  B.A., 
cum laude, University of Notre Dame, 1969; J.D., Boalt Hall School of Law, University 
of California at Berkeley, 1973. 
§ Executive Director & Executive Vice President, National Basketball Players 
Association [NBPA], 1980–95.  Emmy-Winning Co-Executive Producer, Whatever 
Happened to Michael Ray? (TNT documentary, Feb. 2000).  Board Member & Selection 
Committee Member, USA Olympic Basketball, Dream Teams I & II, 1990–95.  Board 
Member & Selection Committee Member, Naismith Memorial Hall of Fame, 1988–95.  
Board Member, Basketball Alumni Foundation, 1988–95.  Board Member, Women’s 
Sports Foundation, 1988–94. Board Member, Sports Careers, Inc., 1988–95.  Teacher & 
Coach, Darby-Colwyn High School, 1965–68.  B.S., Cheney State University, 1965; 
M.B.A., Wharton School of Business Administration, University of Pennsylvania, 1973; 
Ph.D. Candidate, Administration & Organizational Management, University of 
Pennsylvania, School of Education, 1973–78. 
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MS. COWARD:#  This panel will focus on the potential 
conflicts of interest that arise when different sports interests are 
represented by the same individual. 
DEAN FEERICK: Thank you very much. 
Why don’t I go to the panelists?  Mr. Feher? 
MR. FEHER: I would like to start out by talking just a little bit 
about the basic labor structure and the roles that different actors in 
all this play, because unless you have a basic sense of that, you 
really cannot tell where the conflicts may or may not arise. 
I will start with a simple question, which is: If any one of you 
wanted to go out tomorrow and sign up with an NFL player or any 
Major League Baseball player to become a sports agent, could you 
do that? 
The short answer is, unless you have been registered by the 
union in that sport, the answer is no, because in each of the major 
league sports in the United States there is a union that represents 
all of the players in that sport.1 
Now, you may say: Well, what difference does that make? 
 
||  Partner, Proskauer Rose, LLP.  Associate, Proskauer Rose, LLP, 1981–84 & 1985–
89.  Law Clerk to Judge Judith S. Kaye, New York Court of Appeals, 1984–85.  
President, New York State Bar Association [NYSBA], 2001–02.  Member, NYSBA 
Committee on Standards of Attorney Conduct, 1999–present.  Chair, NYSBA Committee 
on Professional Ethics, 1990–94.  Hearing Panel Chair, Departmental Disciplinary 
Committee, First Judicial Department, New York, 1996–99.  Hearing Panel Chair, 
Committee on Grievances, U.S. District Court, Southern District, New York, 1995–2001.  
Special Prosecutor, First Department Disciplinary Committee, New York, 1991–93.  
Adjunct Professor, Georgia Institute of Technology, 1990–93.  Adjunct Professor of 
Legal Ethics, Columbia University School of Law, 1990–93.  B.A., State University of 
New York at Stony Brook, 1978; J.D., New York University School of Law, 1981. 
#  Nicole Coward, Co-Symposium Editor, Fordham Sports Law Forum, Fordham 
University School of Law.  B.A., University of Virginia, 1999; J.D. expected, Fordham 
University School of Law, 2003. 
1 For example, professional football players in the NFL are represented by the NFL 
Players Association [NFLPA], professional hockey players in the National Hockey 
League [NHL] are represented by the NHL Players Association [NHLPA], professional 
basketball players in the National Basketball Association [NBA] are represented by the 
National Basketball Players Association [NBPA], and professional baseball players in 
Major League Baseball [MLB] are represented by the MLB Players Association 
[MLBPA]. See http://www.nflpa.org/main/default.asp; http://www.nhlpa.com; http:// 
www.nbpa.com; http://bigleaguers.yahoo.com. 
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Well, there is a fundamental point there, because once you 
have a union in place, under federal labor law, the union, under the 
National Labor Relations Act,2 has the exclusive authority to 
bargain on behalf of all of those employees on all terms and 
conditions of employment.3 
If the unions wanted to, just like the United Auto Workers does 
with respect to General Motors or Ford or Chrysler, they could sit 
down with the National Basketball Association (NBA), the 
National Football League (NFL) and the others, with each of their 
respective unions, and not negotiate a system where players 
bargain individually together with agents, but instead have a wage 
scale where shortstops get, just hypothetically, $20,000, first 
basemen get $30,000, et cetera, et cetera.4  And I have to admit 
that the owners in the various sports have tried to have that done 
because it is a lot easier and simpler, given the marketplace for 
professional athletes, to have a situation where there is no 
competition for these players who are very sought after.5 
But the unions in each of these sports have decided that they do 
not want to do that.  In the exercise of their authority under federal 
labor law, they delegate a portion of their bargaining authority to 
 
2 National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2000) [hereinafter NLRA]. 
3 Id. § 159(a) (providing that representatives selected to bargain for employees in a 
collective bargaining unit “shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in 
such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining”). 
4 See United Auto Workers [UAW], About UAW: Who We Are, at 
http://www.uaw.org/about/uawmembership.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2003) 
(demonstrating that the UAW is one of the largest and most diverse unions in North 
America); UAW, About UAW: Departments, at http://www.uaw.org/about/barg.html#gm 
(last vited Mar. 25, 2003) (providing examples of the wage-scale concept, as utilized in 
the UAW-GM National Agreement, the UAW-Saturn 1999 Agreement and the UAW-
DaimlerChrysler 1999 Agreement). 
5 See, e.g., Fraser v. Major League Soccer, 284 F.3d 47 (1st Cir. 2002) (holding that 
the teams comprising Major League Soccer [MLS] do not violate antitrust laws in 
functioning as a single entity when negotiating employment contracts with players, 
thereby preventing players from negotiating contracts with individual teams, restricting 
player mobility, and facilitating a hard salary cap, which players claim prevents them 
from attaining market value for their services), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 118 (2002); 
Robert Wagman, MLS, Players Are No Closer to Settlement; Trial Set for September 18, 
Soccer Times, at http://www.soccertimes.com/wagman/2000/feb24.htm (Feb. 24, 2000) 
(explaining the history of the antitrust dispute between MLS and professional soccer 
players in the league). 
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the players with the agents who represent the players, or the 
players individually if the players decide they want to represent 
themselves.6 
You may ask, why?  Part of it is a basic function of economics, 
because if you are a coal miner or an auto worker, it is generally 
easy for your employer to find a replacement for you if you say 
that you are going to leave the job unless your wages are 
increased.7  That is why unions in the various industrial areas 
sought the right to unionize for so long, so that there would not be 
individual bargaining.8  If you look back in history, in the 1920s 
and 1930s, before the Wagner Act9 came into place, all of the 
 
6 As the bargaining representative for a group of professional ballplayers, players’ 
unions have the exclusive right to bargain with the relevant league on players’ behalf. 29 
U.S.C. § 159(a).  Players’ unions allow individual athletes to bargain with team owners 
through the use of agents, as this system enables players to seek the greatest available 
compensation for their unique skills and services.  In order to, among other things, 
promote quality among the players’ individual representatives, the unions demand that 
players use only certified agents who are properly qualified to engage in contract 
negotiation. See, e.g., NBA-NBPA COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT art. XXXVI  
(“The NBA shall not approve any Player Contract between a player and a Team unless 
such player . . . is represented in the negotiations . . . by an agent or representative duly 
certified by the Players Association in accordance with the Players Association’s Agent 
Regulation Program.”), http://www.nbpa.com/cba/articleXXXVI.html; NFLPA, Agent 
Regulations, at http://www.nflpa.org/agents/ main.asp?subPage=Agent+Regulations (last 
visited Mar. 25, 2003) (explaining that agents must be certified by the NFLPA in order to 
represent NFL athletes); NHLPA, Labour & Licensing, at http://www.nhlpa.com/ 
Content/ABOUT_THE_NHLPA/Labour_And_ Licensing.asp (last visited Mar. 25, 2003) 
(explaining that agents must be certified by the NHLPA in order to represent NHL 
athletes); MBLPA, Frequently Asked Questions, at http://bigleaguers.yahoo.com/mlbpa/ 
faq (last visited Mar. 25, 2003) (explaining that agents seeking to represent professional 
baseball players must have at least one client on a MLB team’s forty man roster and 
apply to the MLBPA for certification). 
7 See generally UAW, United Auto Workers Local 2166: The History of Organized 
Labor, at http://www.uaw2166.org/labor.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2003) (describing the 
history of the organized labor movement). 
8 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 158–59 (providing that an employer may not “refuse to bargain 
collectively with the representatives of his employees” and that these representatives 
“shall be the exclusive representatives of such employees . . . for the purposes of 
collective bargaining”). 
9 National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169. See also ABA, THE FIRST 
SIXTY YEARS: THE STORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, 1935–1995, at 10 
(1995), http://www.nlrb.gov/publications/first60yrs/60yrs.html. 
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major industries did not want the unions, they wanted to 
individually negotiate.10 
In sports it is almost a complete mirror image, because the 
economics of sports are such that the individual employees have 
such unique individual talents, and the structure of the league is 
such where you have different people competing for those athletes, 
so it is more advantageous to have competition for the services of 
the individual players.11 
And so the unions representing all those players say, it is better 
for us not to negotiate a wage scale but to have the different 
owners competing for the individual players.12 
And so when you look at agents, what does that mean in terms 
of what they do and how they function? 
The bottom line is that if the National Football League Players 
Association (NFLPA) decided, even with sports agents, that with 
individual bargaining it wanted to have a hundred, ten, a thousand 
or even one agent representing all these players, the NFLPA could 
do that.13  There is a series of court cases, including one involving 
the National Basketball Players Association, the Collins14 case, 
where an agent challenged the whole system of agent regulation 
that was in place, where the agent got suspended.  It went to 
federal court and on appeal to the Tenth Circuit; the federal court 
 
10 See ABA, supra note 9, at 9–20 (describing the history of the NLRA); UAW, supra 
note 7 (describing the history of the organized labor movement). 
11 See generally Wagman, supra note 5 (explaining the dispute between MLS and 
professional soccer players in the league over whether each team should have to negotiate 
as an individual entity with individual players for services; the players are of the opinion 
that only such a structure will allow them to attain full market value for their services). 
12 Teams in the NFL, NHL, NBA, and MLB do compete against one another for 
players’ services.  These players’ respective unions have determined that the players can 
best attain market value for their services via individual negotiations.  Hence, the unions 
have guidelines permitting individual players to negotiate on their own behalf or through 
the use of agents. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
13 Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 159(a), which provides that representatives selected to 
bargain for employees in a collective bargaining unit “shall be the exclusive 
representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective 
bargaining,” a certified union has exclusive control over the manner in which employees 
are represented. 
14 Collins v. Nat’l Basketball Players Ass’n, No. 92-CV-1022, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 
24069 (10th Cir. Sept. 21, 1992). 
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said: No, you can’t challenge this under the antitrust laws because, 
as a matter of federal labor law, the decision as to what to do in 
terms of delegating this authority is completely up to the union.15 
As a result, there are extensive agent regulation programs in 
each of the sports.16  So, for example, in the NFL, if you want to 
represent an agent, not only do you have to pay a fairly substantial 
fee at the outset to fund the agent program, but you also have to 
take and pass a test.17  If you do not take and pass the test, you 
cannot serve as an agent.18 
One of the reasons the union does that in the NFL is because 
the NFL salary cap is incredibly complicated.19  If the NFLPA 
allowed agents who had no knowledge at all as to what the system 
was about to represent players, the agents could do an awful lot of 
harm.20 
It is difficult to police the agents when you have as many 
agents as you do.  I am not going to say that any system is perfect, 
but at the same time, the NFLPA has done periodic examinations 
of the agents to try to ensure that the agents know what they are 
doing, so that the players are not hurt.21 
Within a very, very large area, the union has discretion to pick 
and choose who they want to represent the players and the qualities 
 
15 Id. 
16 See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
17 NFLPA, Agent Amendments: 2002 Agent Regulation Amendments, at 
http://www.nflpa.org/agents/main.asp?subPage=Agent+Amendments (last visited Mar. 
16, 2003). See also NFLPA, supra note 6. 
18 NFLPA, supra note 17. See also NFLPA, supra note 6. 
19 See NFL-NFLPA COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT [CBA] art. XXIV–XXV 
(1998), http://www.nflpa.org/members/main.asp?subPage=CBA+Complete. See 
generally PAUL C. WEILER & GARY R. ROBERTS, SPORTS & THE LAW 314–21 (2d ed. 
1998) (discussing the evolution of the NFL salary cap, which the NFL players agreed to 
in 1993, and explaining the economic trade-offs that take place in order to accommodate 
the owners desire for a salary ceiling and the players unions’ desire to promote 
competition for player services and to establish a salary floor). 
20 See NFLPA, supra note 6 (stating that to ensure that agents have sufficient 
understanding of the league’s financial structure, all agents are required to “[a]ttend an 
NFLPA seminar on individual contract negotiations each year.”); NFLPA, supra note 17. 
21 NFLPA, supra note 17. 
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of those folks.22  These are not just things that are in the legal 
books that do not make a difference day to day. 
On Monday I am going to be in Los Angeles with one of my 
colleagues, Jeff Kessler,23 who is almost always involved in these 
things with me, as some of the folks on the podium and in the 
audience know.  There is going to be an oral argument in a case 
involving a dispute between Leigh Steinberg and David Dunn.24  
This has been very much in the papers.25 
Leigh was considered for many years, and I do not want to say 
he is not equally considered today, because these things are always 
subjective, but for the longest while, Leigh was considered the 
preeminent agent in the NFL.26  He represented a series of first-
round draft picks and quarterbacks.27 
He sold his sports agency to a Canadian company, Assante, in 
a fairly complicated transaction.28  But in selling the sports agency, 
there was a basic question of what you can sell if the union can 
basically decide at any given time who can or cannot represent the 
players.29  If you are an agent and you sell for $100 million or $50 
million your right to represent the players, but at the same time the 
union has regulations in place that say the players can change their 
mind at any time as to who is going to represent them, then there 
are obviously limits as to what you can buy and sell.30 
 
22 See supra notes 13–16 and accompanying text. 
23 Jeffrey L. Kessler is a partner at Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP. See WGM Directory, 
Weil, Gotshal & Manges, at http://www.weil.com/weil/pd_frames.html (last visited Mar. 
25, 2003). 
24 See Steinberg Sues Former Associate, L.A. BUS. J., June 4, 2001, at 29. 
25 E.g., id. 
26 See Richard Weiner, Steinberg Sells Agency for $120 Million; Other Groups May 
Follow, USA TODAY, Oct. 28, 1999, at 7C (describing Steinberg as “one of the NFL’s 
most powerful agents”). 
27 See E. Scott Reckard, Steinberg to Sell Firm for $120 Million, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 28, 
1999, at C1; Weiner, supra note 26, NFLPA, Agent Profile: Steinberg, Leigh, at 
http://www.nflpa.org/agents/agentProfile.asp?ID=07396 (last visited Mar. 16, 2003) 
(listing Steinberg as having negotiated fifteen active contracts). 
28 See Reckard, supra note 27; Weiner, supra note 26. 
29 See Ron Borges, No Vick up Their Sleeve, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 27, 2001, at C7; 
supra notes 13–16 and accompanying text. 
30 Attorneys acting as agents are automatically employed at-will, subject to dismissal at 
the client’s discretion. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16, cmt. 4 (2001) (“A 
client has a right to discharge a lawyer at any time, with or without cause, subject to 
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What is going on in this federal litigation right now is that 
David Dunn, who was a senior person within the Steinberg firm 
and who was principally involved with client relations over the 
years, decided he was going to leave.  He left and took all sorts of 
clients with him.31 
Leigh Steinberg’s firm, Steinberg, Moorad, and Dunn [SMD], 
went to court to try to seek an injunction under state law to 
basically force, directly or indirectly, the clients to come back to 
Mr. Steinberg.32  We are saying that cannot be done because, as a 
matter of federal labor law, state law cannot determine who is 
going to represent this player or that player.33  So, our position is 
that it is absolutely clear under labor law that the union decides.34  
But because of this, all sorts of issues as to who represents whom 
also arise.35 
When you talk about the agents, they generally do not 
represent only a single player.36  If the NFLPA wanted to, it could 
say every agent could only represent one player, which would not 
make sense for anyone.  You want people who have broad 
negotiating experience, so you have agents representing a number 
of players. 
And you have it in a sport where there is a salary cap, where, at 
least within certain rules, there are limits as to how much money 
 
liability for payment for the lawyer’s services.”); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L 
RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-110(b)(4) (2001).  In addition, NFLPA policy guarantees that all 
player representatives are subject to discharge at-will.  See Borges, supra note 29. 
31 See Jonathan E. Kaplan, Show Me the Subpoena!, AM. LAW., June, 2002 (stating that 
Dunn left the firm in early 2001, taking sixty-eight clients with him). 
32 See Steinberg Sues Former Associate, supra note 24, at 29. 
33 See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2000); Collins v. Nat’l Basketball Players Ass’n, No. 92-
CV-1022, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 24069 (10th Cir. Sept. 21, 1992). 
34 See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a); Collins, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 24069, at *1.  The NFLPA’s 
motion to deny Steinberg, Moorad, and Dunn’s [SMD] requested injunctive relief was 
granted, after a jury trial that awarded SMD more than $40 million in damages against 
Mr. Dunn and his co-defendants. See Brenda Samdburg, Brobeck Team Scores $2.7 Mil. 
in Attorney Fees, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 12, 2003, at 4. 
35 See Kaplan, supra note 31; Steinberg Sues Former Associate, supra note 24, at 29. 
36 See, e.g., NFLPA, supra note 27 (listing Steinberg as having fifteen active contracts 
negotiated). 
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you can pay certain players, although teams can go over the cap in 
various circumstances.37 
But if you have an agent who is representing two players and 
the team only has a certain amount of money left under the salary 
cap and the agent is trying to negotiate contracts simultaneously 
with those two players, what does the agent do?  There may be $2 
million under the cap that needs to be split between two players 
and that agent represents both players.38 
So in terms of a basic question—is there a conflict or isn’t 
there a conflict?  That is certainly something to talk about.39  But 
the way the system is constructed, the NFLPA has said that so long 
as those possible situations are disclosed and known to everyone, if 
players can change their representation when they want, then that 
is fine.40 
There are certain limits as to what unions can or cannot do.  In 
terms of conflicts in what agents do, I will just mention one thing 
that is in the news. 
 
37 See NFL-NFLPA COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT art. XXIV, supra note 19. 
38 See Robert E. Fraley & F. Russell Harwell, The Sports Lawyer’s Duty to Avoid 
Differing Interests: A Practical Guide to Responsible Representation, 11 HASTINGS 
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 165, 185 (1989) (“[A] conflict could arise if a lawyer represents 
multiple clients who seek remuneration from a limited fund.  For example, a lawyer may 
represent two NBA players on the same team, where the aggregate salaries of each team 
in that league must not surpass a ‘salary cap.’”). See, e.g., Len Pasquarelli, Adams Still 
Searching for a New Home, ESPN, at http://espn.go.com/nfl/columns/pasquarelli_ 
len/1400183.html (June 28, 2002) (noting that agents Eugene Parker and Roosevelt 
Barnes together represent both linebackers Ray Lewis and Peter Boulware in contract 
renegotiations with the Baltimore Ravens). 
39 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a) (2001) (“A lawyer shall not represent a 
client if the representation of that client will be directly adverse to another client, 
unless . . . each client consents after consultation.”); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L 
RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-16, DR 5-105(a)–(c) (2001). 
40 In this respect, NFLPA policies require basic compliance with the rules of legal 
ethics, which bind attorneys, for all player representatives, whether or not they are 
members of the bar.  Hence, agents must disclose any potential conflicts of interest 
arising out of their representation of multiple clients. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 
R. 1.7; MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-16, DR 5-105(a)–(c)  In addition, 
agents may only serve clients as at-will employees, subject to discharge at their clients’ 
discretion. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16, cmt. 4 (“A client has a right to 
discharge a lawyer at any time, with or without cause, subject to liability for payment for 
the lawyer’s services.”); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-110(b)(4). 
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U.S. News & World Report recently had a cover story about 
frauds that had been committed on NFL players over the years by 
their financial advisors.41  In this case, the NFLPA, as the union, is 
very much concerned about these sorts of issues.42  In one case, 
there was an agent, Tank Black, who engaged in various frauds on 
players43 where he was representing them in the negotiations with 
the teams but at the same time was giving them advice on their 
finances and investing their money.44 
The NFLPA has just implemented a financial advisors program 
so that financial advisors can be registered by the NFLPA as to 
whether they have complied with various regulations under the 
program.45 
But I want to note that there are certain limits as to what unions 
can or cannot do. 
The NFLPA is the union, but in terms of what an employee is 
going to do with his money after he gets it from his employer, that 
is not generally a term or condition of employment.46 
And so this program that the NFLPA is undertaking, which is 
very important, is not mandatory.  It is something in which 
advisors can participate if they choose, but the players will know 
the agent’s choice one way or the other.47 
In terms of how this sort of program deals with potential 
conflicts, the basic principle is generally one of disclosure.  If you 
 
41 See Edward T. Pound, Money Players, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 11, 2002, at 
30. 
42 See generally id. (showing that the NFLPA is very concerned with financial advisors 
defrauding players). 
43 See id.; Agent Tank Black Gets Five-Year Sentence for Swindling Players, SPORTING 
NEWS, May 7, 2002, http://www.sportingnews.com/nfl/articles/20020507/401934.html. 
44 See Pound, supra note 41. 
45 See Michelle Singletary, Giving the Boot to Bad Financial Advice, WASH. POST, 
May 2, 2002, at E3 (explaining that in 2002, the NFLPA initiated a “Financial Advisors 
Program” to establish a code of conduct and check the backgrounds and credentials of 
those proffering services to protect NFL players from financial fraud); NFLPA, Financial 
Advisors, at http://www.nflpa.org/financial/main.asp (last visited Jan. 18, 2003). 
46 See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2000) (noting that employee representatives are empowered 
by the NLRA to bargain with employers concerning only “rates of pay, wages, hours, or 
other conditions of employment”). 
47 See id.; supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
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have a situation with a financial advisor recommending 
investments, it is difficult.  You can not just suggest an investment 
in a company in which you have an interest.48  I think this is the 
case across-the-board.  Many solutions for conflicts require that the 
person on the other end is fully advised of the conflict and is an 
adult in a position to have the information to make the decision.49 
DEAN FEERICK: Thank you very much, Dave.  That is very 
helpful. 
Craig? 
MR. FENECH: The business of representation, obviously, is 
much broader than that.  It involves people in individual sports.  In 
fact, a good part of the last month or so of my time has been taken 
up with two Canadian figure skaters.50  If you had said that to me a 
year ago, I would have laughed at you, but that is the way it has 
been. 
“Conflicts of interest,” it is almost like a magic phrase.  People 
say “conflict of interest” and everybody gasps, they shrink in 
horror—“this is terrible.” 
I think that there are real and apparent conflicts of interest and 
there is a big difference between the two.  There are conflicts 
which are acceptable and waivable by your clients and then there 
are others that are not.51  Let me give you some examples of what I 
am talking about, real-life examples. 
 
48 It is a conflict of interest for an attorney-agent proffering financial advice to 
encourage a client to invest in an entity in which the attorney has an interest without 
disclosing that fact. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-101(a) (2001) 
(“Except with the consent of his client after full disclosure, a lawyer shall not accept 
employment if the exercise of his professional judgment on behalf of his client will be or 
reasonably may be affected by his own financial, business, property, or personal 
interests.”). See also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(a) (2001); MODEL CODE 
OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-1 (2001).  The NFLPA program for Financial Advisors 
imposes similar requirements.  See Financial Advisors, supra note 45. 
49 See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
50 See generally Man Accused in Figure Skating Fix Attempt to Be Extradited to U.S., 
CNN, at http://www.cnn.com/2002/LAW/08/01/figure.skating.fix (Aug. 1, 2002) 
(describing the scandal at the 2002 Olympics in Salt Lake City in which judges allegedly 
conspired to deprive Canadian skaters Jamie Sale and David Pelletier of gold medals). 
51 If an attorney does not have a “reasonable belief that the representation” of one client 
“will not adversely affect the relationship with the other client” or “be materially limited 
by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client,” or if it is not “obvious that he can 
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I represented two radio disc jockeys in another part of the 
country.  I represented both of them in the first negotiation, and I 
talked to them about whether their interests were congruent with 
one another, and determined that they were.52  The fact that their 
contract expired the day before I met with them probably had 
something to do with their view in that particular case.  So, I did 
the contract, and it was about three years long.  I represented them 
over the course of the three years, during which time they would 
proceed to carp about one another to me and made my life kind of 
miserable. 
It developed that one of them felt that he should be paid more 
money than the other.  To me that is an irreconcilable conflict 
unless the other fellow says, “Yes, I agree,” and you will wait a 
long time to hear those words.53 
In that particular instance, I considered that to be an 
irreconcilable conflict.  Therefore, either the clients had to choose 
what they wanted to do, or I had to choose whom I wanted to 
represent. 
As it turned out, it was sort of a mutual thing.  The guy who 
did not want to earn as much money wanted to get a local lawyer, 
and he did so, and I wound up representing the guy who wanted to 
earn more money, and indeed he wound up earning more money. 
So that, to me, is a conflict.  All conflicts must be disclosed, 
but that is one that could not be reconciled, and therefore one of 
them had to go.54 
Now, often it will happen that you represent two people who 
are seeking the same position.  Let me give you an example. 
 
adequately represent the interest of each,” a conflict is unacceptable and cannot be 
waived. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)–(b); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L 
RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105(c). See also MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-16. 
52 After full disclosure, clients may consent to dual representation, provided that the 
conflict of interests is waivable. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7; MODEL CODE 
OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-16, DR 5-105(c). 
53 Hence, the conflict will probably not be waivable. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 1.7; MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-16, DR 5-105(c). 
54 If an unacceptable conflict arises after the commencement of representation, the 
lawyer should withdraw from the representation. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 
1.7, cmt. 2. 
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Years ago, I represented three pitchers on the same Major 
League team.  One pitcher I had represented for years, the other 
one I had picked up as a client a couple of years earlier by referral, 
and he referred me to a third guy who was in the minors who 
wound up making the club. 
Well, the middle guy called me.  His career had not gone as 
well as the other two.  The truth is, he was not as good a pitcher.  
He called me one day and he said, “Craig, you know, I think you 
have done a great job for me, I really like you, and I am going to 
fire you.” 
I said, “Well, why?” 
He said, “I think you have a conflict of interest.” 
I said, “I don’t think that is really the case.”  I would have had 
a conflict of interest if I could have made the determination, or 
even had a substantial influence on the determination, as to who 
made the club.55  But, first of all, the club was keeping ten pitchers, 
not three; and secondly, no general manager has ever asked me, 
“Gee, Craig, which of your clients should I keep with the ball 
club?”  In point of fact, they do not want to hear from me on that 
subject. 
So the conflict in that case, in my opinion, was more apparent 
than real.56  I said this to him at the time, “Look, let’s be honest.  
You know why I am being fired.  You guys called me and said, 
‘We want to buy a house in Seattle.  Do you think that is a wise 
thing to do?’ and I said, ‘No, because I think that you are on the 
bubble as to whether or not you make the club.  I’m picking up 
rumors that you may in fact be traded, and there is a work stoppage 
 
55 If an attorney-agent could determine that one of her clients would succeed at the 
expense of another client, she could not possibly hold a “reasonable belief that the 
representation” of one client would “not adversely affect the relationship with the other 
client” or “be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to [the other] client.”  In 
addition, it would not be “obvious that [s]he [could] adequately represent the interest of 
each,” and the conflict would not be waivable by either client. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)–(b); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105(c). See also 
MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-16. 
56 It is important to remember that even when an attorney-agent is comfortable with 
multiple representation, he should advise his clients of “any circumstances which might 
cause [them] to question his undivided loyalty.” MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY 
EC 5-19. 
2 - PANEL II FORMAT 4/15/03  9:32 AM 
418 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 13: 405 
looming in the next twelve months, so for all those reasons I don’t 
think it’s a good thing to put all your assets into a house and 
encumber yourself with a heavy mortgage.’” 
That was not what his spouse wanted to hear.  That was the 
wrong answer as far as she was concerned, and that is why I was 
being fired.  Okay, you live with that, and he did fire me, and I 
guess he used the conflict of interest argument. 
He said to me, “I’ve talked to other agents who say that no 
reputable agent would represent more than one player on a given 
team.” 
I said, “That is nonsense.  First of all, you can’t control it.  
What are you going to say to me tomorrow if in fact you are 
traded?”  By the way, about a month later, he was traded to a team 
where I do not have any players. 
A lot of the time people employ arguments like conflict of 
interest when really what they are saying is, “My career isn’t going 
as well as I think it should.”  So that to me is an example of an 
apparent conflict of interest rather than a real one. 
However, the client retains the right to view it differently.57  It 
is his career, and if that is what he wants to do, then that is what he 
has to do, whatever the reason.  He does not even have to give you 
a reason.  You are employable at will.58 
I remember one agent who called me one day and he said, 
“What kind of deal is that? The guy can fire you at any time.” 
I said, “I think that it behooves you then to make sure that you 
are always on the same page as your client and that he is aware of 
what your efforts are and that he has some appreciation for those 
efforts.  But you are right.  If job security is what you are looking 
for, this is the wrong business.” 
So there are those kinds of conflicts of interest. 
 
57 Id. (“Regardless of the belief of a lawyer that he may properly represent multiple 
clients, he must defer to a client who holds the contrary belief and withdraw from 
representation of that client.”). 
58 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16, cmt. 4 (“A client has a right to discharge 
a lawyer at any time, with or without cause, subject to liability for payment for the 
lawyer’s services.”); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-110(b)(4). 
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Now I will give you another example.  At one point, I 
represented three collegiate basketball coaches in the United 
States.  I do not know how many Division I programs there are, but 
I had coaches at three of them. 
Two of them decided that they wanted the same job that 
opened up.  I was thinking to myself, “What do I have to do, have 
one client in each sport in order to avoid a conflict?”  That was a 
tricky one. 
The New York Post was talking daily, speculating as to whether 
this guy or that guy was ahead or who the candidates were, and 
they did that very effectively.  They named about twelve 
candidates, and at one point, named each one of them as the front 
runner, so that no matter who got the job, they would be able to 
announce that they had correctly predicted a month earlier that he 
was the front runner.  It is an interesting journalistic technique. 
The way it works is that athletic directors do not even want to 
hear from agents. They think that agents are vermin, and I think the 
agent who directly calls an athletic director and says, “Hey, Joe 
Jones is my client and he really wants the job,” has pretty much 
stuck a dagger in the heart of Joe Jones’ chances.  But it is true that 
you can have some influence on the process from the outside, 
depending on your relationship with the media, your relationship 
with alumni or other coaches.  So, I told them,  “I will do whatever 
you want on this.  I will stay out altogether or either one of you can 
fire me, hopefully not both.” 
Anyway, the bottom line was they both asked that I give my 
honest evaluation of each of their chances.  Really, in that case you 
function more as sort of a counselor. 
The guy will say, “I have a friend who has a friend who dated 
the president of the university.  Do you think I should reach out to 
them?”  You say, “No, I think that would be a bad idea” or a good 
idea, whatever.  That is what you do. 
In that case, neither of them fired me.  One of them indeed got 
the job.  The other one fell out rather quickly.  I found out 
afterwards when I was negotiating the contract for the guy who got 
the job that the other guy did not have a chance, because in fact the 
university had considered suing him some years earlier, before I 
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was representing him.  Although there were certain media people 
promoting his candidacy, he never had a shot. 
So that to me is an example of where there is a potential 
conflict.  You have a duty to fully disclose to your clients what the 
conflict is and what your role will be, but they are free to resolve 
that in whatever fashion they deem appropriate. 
The final thing I will talk about is when I was representing two 
broadcasters who wanted the same position.  This comes up all the 
time.  But what never comes up is what happened next—I guess it 
does not “never” come up, it just rarely comes up. 
The executive producer sat there and said to me, “So, Craig, 
which one of these guys should I hire?”  Now, both of them 
currently worked for this organization, so he knew everything there 
was to know about them. 
I looked at him and I said, “I’ll tell you what.  I’ll answer that 
question if you tell me that my answer is dispositive of the issue, 
because I think you are yanking my chain just to watch me wiggle, 
and I am not about to give you an answer to that question.  You 
know both guys, you know what you want from this particular 
position, and you are not about to cede the authority to make that 
decision to me.  But if you are, I will answer the question.” 
I was bluffing, because had he asked me to, I couldn’t have 
answered that question.  That would have been to me an 
irreconcilable conflict.  I would have had to step out and say to 
both my clients, “either you have to get somebody else, or you can 
keep me, but I can’t continue to represent both of you in this 
regard.” 
However, I was pretty sure that he was bluffing, and indeed he 
was.  He laughed and he said, “So you won’t even admit you have 
a conflict?” 
So he just laughed and moved on.  In that case, neither of them 
got the job.  So that is an example of a conflict that was real, but 
turned out to be illusory, in that neither guy got the job. 
But it depends on what your role is in securing the job.  People 
misapprehend what the role of an agent is.  I mean, you watch 
these movies on television and you think the agent walks in and 
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says, “I demand that my guy get hired for this.”  It is just nonsense.  
Jerry Maguire59 was an amusing movie, but, frankly, it bore the 
same relationship to reality that most movies do, a distant one.60 
By the way, I am one of the few agents who did not claim to be 
the prototype for Jerry Maguire, and I did not think he was a better 
person at the end of the movie than he was at the beginning of the 
movie.  It seemed to me that his big concern for the wide receiver 
was when the guy got hurt, and that was his only meal ticket.  How 
does that differ from when he started? 
DEAN FEERICK: Thank you for that very interesting 
presentation. 
Charles Grantham? 
MR. GRANTHAM: Thanks to David and Craig for providing 
an outline of what potential conflicts exist.  I will share a few 
things and give you a historical perspective about why we created 
agent regulations in the first place. 
We initiated the agent regulatory program back in the early 
1980s, quite frankly, as a result of players complaints about the 
excessive fees charged for the representation of players.61  At that 
time, they were being charged from ten to twenty percent for 
contract negotiations.62  And, from a selfish perspective, players 
were asking, “What can you do about these enormous fees?” 
That got me thinking as to how we, as an exclusive bargaining 
unit, could regulate player agents.  That was back in the early 
1980s.63 
 
59 JERRY MAGUIRE (Tristar 1996) (feature film about a premier sports agent who opens 
his own business after he is dismissed from his firm). 
60 Cf. Reckard, supra note 27 (claiming that Leigh Steinberg “was the model for the 
agent portrayed in Jerry Maguire”). 
61 See Sam Goldaper, Plan to Certify Agents and Limit Fees, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 
1986, at B9 (discussing the NBPA’s agent regulation program, initiated in 1986, which 
requires that agents wishing to negotiate contracts with NBA teams be certified by the 
union and agree to fee limitations). 
62 See generally id. (noting that the 1986 NBPA agent regulation program limits agent 
fees to an annual maximum of four percent). 
63 See Danny Robbins & Manny Topol, Certification Denied for Agent, NEWSDAY 
(N.Y.), May 30, 1988, at 74. 
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Also, in the early 1980s came the introduction of revenue 
sharing and salary caps in professional sports.64  We were the first 
to engage in such an arrangement with management.65  However, if 
I had to do it again, I would say that we would not agree to a 
revenue-sharing arrangement which included hard salary caps.66  
This first agreement had exceptions that allowed teams to exceed 
the agreed upon cap.  This first agreement had exceptions that 
allowed teams to exceed the agreed upon cap. 
So there are two perspectives, one from just being the advocate 
of players’ rights and two, those potential conflicts which would 
arise from the agreement.67 
But the reality of it is very simple, and that is that any of you in 
this room could be an agent tomorrow if you had a son or a brother 
or a cousin who was seven-feet, three-inches, who averaged forty-
five points a game in college, and had a very adept left-handed 
hook shot.  You could be his agent and probably none of the 
unions would prevent that from happening.68 
I mean, we can talk about the regulatory process: the test, the 
application, but the reality is you need a client.  If you can get 
yourself a client: a football player, a baseball player, or a 
basketball player, then I guarantee you that you can become an 
agent very quickly. 
I guess the other area of interest to me, is one that represents a 
conflict with the NCAA.69  Of course, all of us on this panel could 
complain about the potential conflicts that they face. 
 
64 See Cerisse Anderson, Players Seek End to NBA Salary Cap, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 22, 
1987, § 3, at 12 (noting that the NBA negotiated a revenue-sharing agreement with its 
players in 1983, guaranteeing them fifty-three percent of the league’s revenues under the 
CBA and noting that salary caps imposing minimum and maximum team revenues were 
instituted in the 1984–85 season to promote competitive parity). 
65 See id. 
66 See generally Steve Ashburner, Wanna Beat Magic? Put ‘Em on the Line; O’Neal 
Clangs Iron the Loudest, STAR TRIB. (Minn.), Apr. 23, 1995, at C6 (explaining that 
“hard” salary caps differ from “soft” caps in that soft caps allow teams to spend over the 
cap in order to re-sign free agents, while hard caps strictly limit a team’s spending). 
67 See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
68 But see unions’ various regulations of agents, supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
69 See Greg Garber & Lyn Bixby, Should We Pay College Players? Camby Case Puts 
Focus on Agents’ Giving of Gifts, HARTFORD COURANT (Conn.), June 23, 1996, at A1. 
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I wrote an article some ten years ago regarding giving some 
college players a share of the economic pie.70  What was present 
then is clearly present today, which is that the television networks 
have someone representing their interests, the athletic directors 
have someone representing their interests, the college coaches have 
someone representing their interests, and the players have no one.71 
As we watch “March Madness” today—a multibillion-dollar 
contract for CBS to present the games in March—we begin to 
wonder again: the issue of education,72 is it a priority or is it a 
distraction?  At this point, it is clear that in March, academics 
become a distraction.73  I have a keen interest in seeing that college 
athletes are represented, and represented fairly. 
The whole conflict of interest question and understanding the 
issues relating to conflicts of interest, in most cases, is too 
sophisticated for some of your potential clients to totally 
understand.74 
Prior to 1980, for example, before there were regulations, the 
NBA was like the “Wild West.”  You had agents representing the 
coach, the general manager, and the player, and you had players 
say, “I want that agent because he represents the coach, the general 
manager and another player on the team,” not understanding that 
 
70 Charles Grantham, It’s Time to Give Players a Cut, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1990, § 8, 
at 10. 
71 See Garber & Bixby, supra note 69 (discussing the problem of “improper 
inducements by agents” and questioning whether agent representation of college athletes 
should be permitted). 
72 See generally Barry Temkin, Duncan Asks Why Colleges Don’t Educate, CHI. TRIB., 
Mar. 31, 2002, at 18 (addressing the issue of poor academic performance by college 
athletes). See Peter Alfano, The Tug of War Between Athletics and Academics, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 27, 1983, § 5, at 1 (discussing the conflict between academic eligibility and 
success, and the pressures of athletic performance and success faced by student-athletes). 
73 See Tom McMillen, March Madness Really About Frenzy for Money, USA TODAY, 
Apr. 1, 2002, at 13A (discussing the influence of money on college sports in light of the 
$6 billion contract signed between CBS and the NCAA for television rights to eleven 
years of basketball coverage, the deleterious effect of money on the education of student-
athletes, and the inability of the NCAA to effectively reform this system). 
74 Where clients are unable to fully comprehend the nature of potential conflicts, 
disclosure requirements cannot serve their intended purpose. See MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2001); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-16, DR 5-
105(c) (2001). 
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down the road that conflict could be damaging to their potential 
careers. 
So in many cases, it really will rely on how well you 
communicate with your client so that he understands what a 
conflict of interest is—whether it is perceived, whether it is real.75  
These issues are practical, the ones that you have to confront with 
your client. 
DEAN FEERICK: Thank you very much.  It is very helpful. 
Steve Krane? 
MR. KRANE: I think it is accurate to say that player agents 
frequently run into real or perceived conflicts that have to be dealt 
with in one way or another.  Sometimes agents try to deal with 
these conflicts by saying, “I am not functioning as a lawyer for this 
particular player or for any of my clients.  I am functioning just as 
their agent.  You do not have to be a lawyer to be an agent.  I am 
doing something that any non-lawyer could do if they pass the test 
or go through the registration process or whatever.” 
But an important thing to remember if you are a lawyer is that 
you are subject to the ethical rules of the legal profession whether 
you are functioning as a lawyer or not, or whether you think you 
are functioning as a lawyer or not, and you will be held to those 
standards.  So do not think you can avoid the conflict of interest 
rules when representing players with conflicting interests just by 
saying, “I am not providing legal services to them at this particular 
moment, or at all.”76 
We have had a number of instances over the years of agents 
who got raked over the coals in the press, the back pages of the 
tabloids, for representing what were perceived to be conflicting 
 
75 See generally MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-19 (“Regardless of the 
belief of a lawyer that [s]he may properly represent multiple clients,” she must disclose 
even the potential perception of a conflict of interest and “defer to a client who holds the 
contrary belief” as to whether representation should continue.). 
76 Once admitted to the bar, attorneys must comply with ethical standards in all 
dealings, whether or not they are of a specifically legal nature. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 8.4(a); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(a)(1). See also 
MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 1-5. 
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interests.  And sometimes a perception is reality and they are 
indeed doing things that perhaps they should not do. 
Money drives the sports world like it drives everything else.  It 
drives agents, and it is very hard to say, as a lawyer, as an agent, as 
any kind of professional, to a potential client, “I cannot take you 
on; go somewhere else.”  Nobody likes to say those words ever, 
because you are losing out on whatever up-side potential may exist 
for representing them.77 
But sometimes you have to say that.  Sometimes, as you have 
heard from the panelists so far, conflicts are irreconcilable.  That 
comes out of the concept in the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct that governs lawyers in most places in the country, or the 
Code of Professional Responsibility, which governs lawyers in 
New York, that sometimes even the informed consent of a client is 
not sufficient to allow you to take on a representation in the face of 
a conflict of interest.  There will be some conflicts that are so 
extreme that, no matter what you tell a client and no matter what 
they say, you should not take on that representation.  So bear that 
in mind. 
This is not something that is just a sports issue.  This is 
something that all lawyers face in various contexts, particularly 
when, in the sports context, you have team sports where there are 
salary caps in place, so any negotiation that you have for multiple 
players on a team is, in effect, a zero-sum game—somebody wins, 
somebody loses; somebody is going to get more, and if that 
somebody gets more, another somebody gets less.78 
That happens a lot in the commercial setting too, where, for 
example, you have an insolvent defendant in a litigation and you 
are representing two claimants against a single finite insurance 
policy.  There is only so much money there that is available to pay 
these two claimants.  How can you represent both of them?  Can 
 
77 See Goldaper, supra note 61 and parenthetical accompanying note 62 (explaining 
that an agent can earn up to four percent commission on each player contract negotiation 
under NBPA rules). 
78 See Fraley & Harwell, supra note 38, at 185 (“[A] conflict could arise if a lawyer 
represents multiple clients who seek remuneration from a limited fund.  For example, a 
lawyer may represent two NBA players on the same team, where the aggregate salaries of 
each team in that league must not surpass a ‘salary cap.’”). 
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you really effectively represent both, even if they both agree up-
front to the simultaneous representation?79  That is a difficult 
question that gets talked about quite a bit in ethics circles. 
The adequacy of disclosure is something else to keep in mind.  
Are you really telling the clients everything they need to know, 
even in the context of a waivable conflict, for them to make an 
informed decision, a reasoned decision, as to whether you are the 
best person to represent them or whether they should go 
somewhere else? 
It is a hard thing to do, to sit down with a client and tell them: 
this is the conflict, this is what could happen down the line, these 
are the implications of your waiving the conflict and agreeing to be 
represented by me because of these other interests that I have.80 
Sometimes you may not be in a position even to make that 
disclosure because it would require you to reveal confidential 
information that relates to another client.  And if you cannot make 
that kind of disclosure, if there is something secret going on for 
one of these other clients that you have a conflicting interest with, 
you are not going to make to be able to make the effective 
disclosure that you need to even ask for a waiver.81 
So these are all concerns that come up in every aspect of legal 
practice whenever you represent more than one client.  Someone 
once asked me, “How do you avoid conflicts of interest?”  I said, 
“Never have a client,” because as soon as you have one client, 
there is the potential for a conflict between your business interests, 
 
79 See, e.g., Pasquarelli, supra note 38 (noting that agents Eugene Parker and Roosevelt 
Barnes together represented both linebackers Ray Lewis and Peter Boulware in contract 
negotiations with the Baltimore Ravens). 
80 Such a discussion would constitute full disclosure as required by the rules of legal 
ethics.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2001); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L 
RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-16, DR 5-105(c) (2001). 
81 Attorney-client confidentiality requires that each client consent to all details of his 
representation before disclosure. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a).  If one 
client refuses to consent to the disclosure of information which another client would need 
to make an informed decision as to whether to waive a potential conflict of interest, the 
attorney may not attempt to seek a waiver in absence of full disclosure, and must instead 
decline or withdraw from representation. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7, 
cmt. 5. 
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your personal interests and their interests.82  When you have two 
clients, you might as well hang it up.  You are never going to avoid 
conflicts of interest. 
The way to deal with that is to detect them quickly, talk to the 
client, and sometimes make the judgment that this is not something 
that you should be doing. 
Now, this is not something that is peculiar to representation of 
individual athletes or entertainment personalities.  My practice has 
been almost exclusively representing sports leagues.  As you 
probably know, the major sports leagues are either joint ventures 
or unincorporated associations,83 or in the case of Major League 
Soccer a single corporate entity—although we are still waiting for 
the First Circuit to tell us a little bit more information about that.84  
But, by and large, the leagues are associations of individual 
businesses that agree to come together in a joint venture or an 
unincorporated association to play a sport and have a schedule and 
officials and so on. 
If you represent these leagues, you always end up representing 
the league entity and the individual franchises in the league.  When 
the league gets sued, the complaint names the NBA and a list of all 
 
82 See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-101(a) (“Except with the consent 
of his client after full disclosure, a lawyer shall not accept employment if the exercise of 
his professional judgment on behalf of his client will be or reasonably may be affected by 
his own financial, business, property, or personal interests.”). See also generally MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(a); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-1. 
83 A joint venture consists of “an association of persons or companies jointly 
undertaking some commercial enterprise.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 839 (6th ed. 1990).  
An unincorporated association is a “voluntary group of persons, without a charter, formed 
by mutual consent for purpose of promoting common enterprise.” Id. at 1531. 
84 In 1997, eight professional soccer players sued MLS, investor/owners who controlled 
some of the teams, and the United States Soccer Federation [USSF] for antitrust 
violations under the Sherman and Clayton Acts. See Wagman, supra note 5 (describing 
the dispute between MLS and professional soccer players in the league over whether each 
team should have to negotiate as a separate entity with players for services or whether the 
league should be permitted to continue operating all of the teams as single entity).  In 
March 2002, the First Circuit decided that the existence of MLS as a single entity was not 
unlawful. See Fraser v. Major League Soccer, 284 F.3d 47 (1st Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 
123 S. Ct. 118 (2002). 
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of the franchise owners in the league, and you appear for all of 
them.85 
What then happens when a dispute arises between a team and a 
league, like a franchise relocation situation,86 or a dispute over 
local TV rights like the Chicago Bulls litigation that went on for 
six and a half years in the early 1990s?87  What do you do when 
the team then says, “Hey, you cannot be adverse to me, you 
represent me.  You represent me in six other ongoing litigations, 
plus you advise me constantly by sitting with the Board of 
Governors and talking to us on legal issues?”  How do you deal 
with that issue? 
Fortunately, most of the time it does not get raised, and if it 
does not get raised, you sort of blink at it and go on.  But it is an 
issue that has arisen. 
It is dealt with in some leagues by the adoption of by-laws that 
involve an advance waiver by the individual teams that they will 
not object to the league being represented by a law firm that 
represents the league and the teams in other matters when and if it 
happens that they have a dispute with the league.  So you get the 
advance consent to a conflict of interest.88  That has held up so far.  
It has not been challenged, so it has held up very nicely.  But it 
 
85 See, e.g., Bridgeman v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 838 F. Supp. 172 (D. N.J. 1993) 
(listing the NBA and all the franchise owners as defendants). 
86 For example, six NFL teams relocated between 1982 and 1995, including the 
Raiders, twice.  See, e.g., City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 176 Cal. Rptr. 646 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1981), vacated, 646 P.2d 835 (Cal. 1982); Chris Harry, NFL Owners in a 
League of Their Own, ORLANDO SENTINEL TRIB., Mar. 17, 2002, at C1. See also Alan 
Abramson, Raiders, NFL Keep Arguing Before Case Goes to the Jury, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 
28, 2001, at D2 (discussing the Oakland Raiders’ suit against the NFL in which the team 
argued that the league’s failure to finance a new stadium forced it to relocate back to 
Oakland). 
87 See Chi. Prof’l Sports v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 95 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 1996) (hearing 
a suit by the Chicago Bulls and a cable television station against the NBA for antitrust 
violations due to the broadcast restrictions and fees that the league sought to impose). 
88 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2001); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L 
RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-16, DR 5-105(c) (2001). 
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remains to be seen what will happen if somebody argues about 
that, because advance waivers are a controversial issue.89 
I would just like to briefly talk about one other conflict, the one 
time in my practice when conflicts of interest and sports law came 
together in a very prominent way and in a very unusual way. 
It involved the president of the United States Olympic 
Committee (USOC) in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Robert 
Helmick.90  Bob Helmick was a lawyer.  He was a lawyer with a 
municipal bond practice in Des Moines, Iowa,91 and he was a 
sports volunteer par excellence and did a tremendous amount of 
good for the USOC and devoted a tremendous amount of time to 
the Olympic movement and moving it forward in the United 
States.92 
Unfortunately, this did not do particularly good things for his 
legal practice.  His partners became very annoyed with him that he 
was spending so much time on Olympic matters and not enough on 
municipal bonds in Des Moines.93  He was put on the so-called 
“eat what you kill” approach to partner compensation, which is 
essentially—we will call you a partner, but you are compensated 
based solely on what you generate yourself.94  This put a 
tremendous amount of financial pressure on him to try to generate 
some business for himself so that he would have some income. 
So he did what he knew best.  He went to some clients, or 
potential clients, who were doing business with the Olympic 
Committee, or who wanted to do business with the Olympic 
Committee, or other entities within the Olympic movement and 
had them put him on retainer as a consultant and took hundreds of 
thousands of dollars from them over the course of a number of 
 
89 See Jonathan J. Lerner, Honoring Choice by Consenting Adults: Prospective Conflict 
Waivers As a Mature Solution to Ethical Gamesmanship, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 971 
(2001) (discussing of the controversy surrounding the use of advance waivers). 
90 See Phil Hersh, USOC Boss Won’t Quit over Conflict Charges, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 6, 
1991, at 3C. 
91 Id. 
92 See id. (listing other sports associations on which Helmick served). 
93 See Mike Dodd & Rachel Schuster, Helmick Says Clients Were OK; Critics 
Disagree, USA TODAY, Sept. 5, 1991, at 2C. 
94 See id. 
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years, $50,000 which would be good for X number of hours of 
services,95 and the services were generally “I’d like to meet So-
and-So; could you arrange the introduction?”96 
This came out in the press.  I am not telling you anything that 
is confidential.97  This was widely reported in 1991.98  I was the 
chief investigator for the Olympic Committee that delved deeply 
into this situation and reported and made recommendations to the 
committee.99 
Ultimately, Mr. Helmick was forced to resign from his 
position, not just as president of the Olympic Committee, but as a 
member of the International Olympic Committee (IOC).100  At that 
time, even Nazi war criminals had not been forced to resign from 
the IOC.101  Of course, times have changed.102  He was really a 
pioneer in that regard of leaving the IOC.103 
But that was one area where sports law and legal ethics came 
right together, clashing on the front pages of the newspapers. 
Conflicts are everywhere.  You are lawyers or are going to be 
lawyers, and you will be dealing with conflicts, no matter what 
kind of practice you are in, everyday of your careers.  The key, and 
I advise you if you are still in law school to listen closely in your 
ethics class, is that ninety percent of dealing with ethical issues is 
issue spotting and knowing enough to ask a question; knowing 
enough to see a problem approaching.  You do not have to know 
the answers.  If you do not know the answers, call me and pay me 
my fee and I will give you the answers. 
 
95 See id. 
96 See Business Deals Draw Attention, USA TODAY, Sept. 6, 1991, at 8C (describing 
the nature of Hemlick’s relationships with various companies and individuals). 
97 See Mike Dodd & Rachel Schuster, Helmick Report Has New Change, USA TODAY, 
Nov. 22, 1991, at 2C (crediting USA Today with breaking the story). 
98 See id. 
99 See Ken Stephens, USOC Probe Leaves Schiller with an Improved Attitude, DALLAS 
MORNING NEWS, Dec. 22, 1991, at 18B. 
100 See id. 
101 See John Powers, Chaos Reigns with Soviets After Latest Developments; Many 
Uncertainties Must Be Hammered Out, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 15, 1991, at 54 (stating that 
Helmick was the first member of the International Olympic Committee [IOC] to “resign 
under fire” in fifty-five years). 
102 See id. 
103 See id. 
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At this point, I will turn it back to the Dean to open up for 
questions. 
DEAN FEERICK: Thank you very much.  We will have a 
comment from the members of the panel. 
David? 
MR. FEHER: I just wanted to note one thing, because it is 
interesting.  Steve had mentioned that whenever in the bankruptcy 
context you have people going against a finite pool, there is 
conflict and how that would be analogized to the agent context. 
I do not know how far this goes for sure, but it is a little bit 
different in the union context, in the sense that those sorts of moral 
questions arise all the time with unions, where in a collective 
bargaining negotiation they may be told by the employer: “You 
have $1 million and you can spend that on your own employees 
however you want.  If you want it to go to this plant, that plant or 
another plant, that is your choice.  We do not really care, but that is 
all that we are going to spend.”  Then those union bargainers have 
to make that tough decision as to who gets the money. 
Now, agent compensation is driven by how much player salary 
they individually help to create, and they are not on salary from the 
union, so it is slightly different.104  But at the same time, they are 
exercising authority delegated by the union in a similar context, 
which can happen where clubs or even leagues will say, “You get 
this money and you can do whatever you want with it,” and then 
the delegated agent of the union or the union itself has to decide.105 
The union faces tough decisions all the time as to where money 
goes between veterans or rookies, or this particular type of player 
or that particular type of player.  Those are inherent in the structure 
of the labor laws because the union is the exclusive bargaining 
representative of everyone.106 
 
104 See, e.g., Kenneth Abo & Jack P. Sahl, A Professional Responsibility and Primer for 
Today’s Entertainment Lawyer, 18 ENT. & SPORTS L. 3, 7 (2000) (noting that sports 
agents are usually compensated by their clients on a contingency fee); Goldaper, supra 
note 61 (explaining that an agent can earn up to 4 percent commission on each player 
contract negotiation under NBPA rules). 
105 See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2000); Fraley & Harwell, supra note 38. 
106 29 U.S.C. § 159(a). 
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DEAN FEERICK: Thank you very much. 
Let me ask the other two panelists if there is anything more 
they wanted to say, now that everyone has spoken? 
MR. FENECH: First of all, the situation where an agent can 
represent the coach, the general manager and the players on the 
same team, exists today in the NFL.107  It does not in the NBA108 
and it is sort of a gray area in Major League Baseball.109  It used to 
not exist, and now there has been some blurring of that.110 
The second is what Dave just talked about, and Charlie can 
speak to this better than anyone, that situation exists every time 
there is a collective bargaining negotiation, because not all of your 
membership is situated the same way and you have to trade off the 
interests of one group to get something for another.111 
The clearest example I can think of right off the top of my head 
was there was a collective bargaining situation in baseball where 
the union gave back the right to go to salary arbitration, which is 
one of the paramount rights that a player can earn in baseball,112 
and moved it back from two years to three years, thereby dropping 
the hammer on a whole class of players, one of whom happened to 
be Tom Henke, who I was representing at the time, who would 
otherwise have been eligible for salary arbitration,113 and it cost 
Henke and many of the players in that group hundreds of 
 
107 NFLPA agent regulations do not expressly prohibit such representations, but they do 
prohibit engaging in activity “which creates an actual or potential conflict of interest or 
the appearance of conflict of interest with the effective representation of NFL players.” 
NFLPA, supra note 6. 
108 See Richard Justice & Mark Asher, Falk’s Role in Jordan Deal Is a ‘Concern’; 
Agent Rules Under Review, WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 2001, at D1 (noting that the NBPA 
prohibits an agent from representing both a player and being a team executive). 
109 See, e.g., Thomas Hill, Valentine’s “Double Agent”, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), July 24, 
1997, at 67 (indicating that then-MLB rules prohibiting player agents from representing 
management without permission of the players union). 
110 See id. 
111 See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a). 
112 See generally Murray Chass, Lacking Suitors, Bonds Remains with the Giants, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 20, 2001, at S1 (discussing the probable benefit to Bonds of his decision to 
exercise his right to salary arbitration). 
113 Salary arbitration eligibility was increased from two to three years under the MLB-
MLBPA CBA agreed to on August 7, 1985. Baseball Labor Stoppages, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 
31, 2002, § 4, at 6. 
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thousands, even millions of dollars, and I do not remember 
anybody asking for any waiver of conflict of interest in that regard. 
DEAN FEERICK: Mr. Grantham? 
MR. GRANTHAM: I would add one thing.  Keep an eye on 
the baseball negotiations, because from my perspective, they will 
probably not agree to a revenue sharing or salary cap.114  I think if 
you look at all the sports, the hard caps become real problems for 
unions and for individual athletes.115 
I think the interesting thing to watch with regard to baseball is 
that the kind of revenue sharing that they are negotiating is revenue 
sharing among teams.116  As long as the union can keep 
management focused on revenue sharing among themselves, then 
the union will prevail and not have a salary cap or revenue sharing 
with the players.117 
Revenue sharing as a technique is clearly, very simply put, a 
management technique, because they control access to the numbers 
and the process.  They control access to the information and all the 
financial operations.118  In spite of what anyone will tell you on the 
union side,119 the union will not get access to every single entity 
and the revenue generated by them.120  And if, in fact, you do not 
have a staff, from a forensic standpoint, to monitor management’s 
 
114 Steven Greenhouse, This Time, a Tie Breaks the Deadlock, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 
2002, at D1. 
115 See Anderson, supra note 64 (discussing the frustration of NBA players with the 
hard salary cap in that league). 
116 Greenhouse, supra note 114.  Cf. Anderson, supra note 64 (explaining that the 
NBPA consented to a hard salary cap in exchange for NBA owners agreeing to 53 
percent revenue sharing with the players). 
117 See Greenhouse, supra note 114. Cf. Anderson, supra note 64. 
118 See, e.g., Dale Hofmann, Selig’s Biggest Battles Are Ahead, MILWAUKEE J. 
SENTINEL, Sept. 1, 2002, at 1C. 
119 See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, Coolly, Fehr Plays His Hand, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 
2002, at D1. According to Donald Fehr, head of the MLBPA, the union generally does 
not oppose revenue sharing, but opposes it only when coupled with a luxury tax, since the 
combination of the two effectively acts as a salary cap. Id. 
120 See, e.g., Hofmann, supra note 118 (criticizing the CBA reached between the 
MLBPA and baseball management on August 30, 2002, for failing to require that shared 
revenue be spent on the players and ensure that the additional revenue will be used to 
improve the teams). 
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conduct you will not get full disclosure and full information from 
them.121 
As a result, the hard salary cap jeopardizes all these individual 
athletes.122 
QUESTIONER: One of the things that has always bothered me 
is the salary cap that you have in professional football and 
basketball.  Of course, it is much worse, it seems, in football 
because you have so many players on one team that have to be let 
go because of the salary cap.123  In baseball, they have their 
problems too, where you have somebody like Steinbrenner who 
can pay all kinds of money and there is nobody else who can 
compete with that.124  But it seems that the salary cap, certainly in 
professional football, is not the answer, where a team might win 
the Super Bowl and in the next year they have to let go half of their 
players.125 
MR. FEHER: By the way, as counsel for the players, I want to 
say that I wholeheartedly agree that the salary cap is not an answer 
for anything. 
I do want to say that in the NFL, the only reason the salary cap 
is there is because it is the result of a settlement after a trial where 
we won a verdict but there were threats of an appeal and the legal 
proceedings could have gone on, so it was not agreed to with a 
high degree of enthusiasm.126 
The other thing that I want to mention is that in terms of 
players getting cut, I cannot give you a percentage on this, but I 
wholeheartedly believe that the salary cap is in some ways the 
 
121 See id. 
122 See Anderson, supra note 64; Hoffman, supra note 118. 
123 See John Clayton, Salary Cap Decisions Affect League Parity, ESPN, at 
http://espn.go.com/nfl/columns/clayton_john/1260343.html (Oct. 6, 2001); Aaron 
Rennie, Salary-Cap Ravaged Ravens Practically Starting Over, CBS, at 
http://cbs.sportsline.com/nfl/story/5645600 (Aug. 27, 2002). 
124 Clayton, supra note 123. 
125 See id.; Rennie, supra note 123. 
126 See Clark C. Griffith, New Law Provides Optimism in the Coming Baseball Labor 
Negotiation, ANTITRUST MAG., Spring 2002, http://www.ccgpa.com/atart12.htm. 
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world’s greatest excuse for any team.127  And I have talked to 
coaches about this, in terms of grievances as to why guys are cut. 
At a grievance hearing where a coach just told a player that he 
was one of the greatest players in the world, and then he cut him, 
the question was—was the player released because of the cap or 
was it because he was not such a good player? 
The coach said, “What do want me to do?  Do you want me to 
go to the player and say, ‘I think you’re on the down-side of your 
career, we really don’t want you anymore,’ or do you want me to 
say, ‘We cut you because of the cap?’”128 
In that instance, and I think in a lot of other instances, the cap 
is an impersonal and ready excuse for a lot of teams who are going 
to cut guys anyway,129 and where they do not want to be seen by 
either the teammates or in the papers as making a negative 
comment on a player.130  The player is going to go out and try to 
get a job with another team, and in many instances he does go out 
and get a job with another team at a pretty good salary.131 
And so I would just say that when you see these things, take it 
with a little bit of a grain of salt because there is some measure of 
courtesy involved and excuses, which are understandable.  But it is 
easier to blame a cap than it is to blame a player or a team. 
MR. GRANTHAM: If I can add for a moment, from the 
beginning, both the employer and employees must have a joint 
philosophy as to the league operation.132  On management’s part, 
you have X number of teams.  On the labor side, you have uniquely 
talented individuals to fill these teams’ rosters.133  Each of these is 
 
127 See NFLPA, IT HAPPENS EVERY FEBRUARY: MEDIA MISPERCEPTIONS OF THE 
CURRENT NFL SYSTEM (2002) (“Bottom line: The cap has become a most convenient 
strawman.”), http://www.nflpa.org/PDFs/Shared/Media_ Misperceptions.pdf. 
128 See id. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
131 See id. 
132 See, e.g., William J. Hoffman, Comment, Dallas’ Head Cowboy Emerges Victorious 
in a Licensing Showdown With the NFL: National Football League Properties v. Dallas 
Cowboys Football Club et al., 7 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 255, 260–64 (1997) (describing 
the NFL’s philosophy of cooperation among its teams). 
133 See Phila. World Hockey Club v. Phila. Hockey Club, 351 F. Supp. 462, 501–02 
(E.D. Pa. 1972) (stating that NHL owners paid high salaries to players as a result of the 
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a uniquely talented individual, and therefore a cap restricts and 
prohibits them from realizing their real worth in the 
marketplace.134 
Secondly, the difference between basketball and football, is 
that most contracts signed in football are not guaranteed,135 and as 
a result, they have a hard cap and simply can replace or waive 
players in order to get under the cap for the following year.136 
You do not see that in basketball because they are guaranteed 
contracts,137 and once they have signed the player, they must pay 
him, and will not likely waiver him unless a settlement is reached 
or a guaranteed portion of his salary.138 
So it goes back to the league’s philosophy.  For example, the 
NFL has decided that they would like to have a new Super Bowl 
winner every year or, it’s the competitive balance argument.139  
They simply would rather for these teams to compete on a level 
playing field.140  Gone are the days in football of dynasties.141  The 
NFL hard salary cap promotes parody. 
Perhaps basketball will follow suit.142  However, the problem 
in the NBA is the current structure denies teams the ability to 
 
players’ skill, and holding that professional hockey players are not “interchangeable 
products” for antitrust purposes); Emily C. Chi, Star Quality and Job Security: The Role 
of the Performers’ Unions in Controlling Access to the Acting Profession, 18 CARDOZO 
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 72–74 (2000) (outlining the differences between union members in 
construction work and unions in the entertainment industry). 
134 See Stephen F. Ross, Antitrust Options to Redress Anticompetitive Restraints and 
Monopolistic Practices by Professional Sports Leagues, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 133, 
152–54 (2001) (examining labor market restraints in professional sports leagues). 
135 See Randy Cross, Thoughts from a Dry Week of Owners Meetings, SPORTING NEWS, 
Mar. 20, 2002, http://www.sportingnews.com/voices/randy_cross/20020320.html; 
NFLPA, A New Look at Guaranteed Contracts in the NFL, at http://www.nflpa.org/ 
PDFs/Shared/Guaranteed_Contracts.pdf (last visited Mar. 16, 2003). 
136 See, e.g., Tim Tucker, No Guarantees in the NFL, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Mar. 3, 2002. 
137 See id. 
138 See id. 
139 See Justin Brown, Pro Football’s Triumph of Equal Opportunity, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR, Jan. 3, 2003, at 3. 
140 See id. 
141 See id. 
142 See, e.g., John Donovan, In Search of a Dynasty, CNN/SI, at http://sportsillustrated. 
cnn.com/inside_game/john_donovan/news/2000/08/04/dynasty (Aug. 4, 2000). 
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improve.143  For example, the New York Knicks are stuck for the 
next five years.144 
Now, if you were the Commissioner of the NBA, you ask 
yourself, “The major markets—New York, Chicago, Boston, 
L.A.—I would like for them to be competitive every year.”145  
Therefore, the structure a revenue-sharing agreement, would 
enable all teams New York, Chicago, Boston, et cetera, or George 
Steinbrenner, for example, the right to pay what he wants to get a 
good team.146  So it starts with the league’s philosophy and vision 
with regard to revenue sharing. 
It ends in the collective bargaining agreement that you have 
negotiated with the players.147 
MR. FENECH: I just want to say one other thing.  Everybody 
links revenue sharing with salary cap.148  There is no reason why it 
has to be.149  There is nothing to prohibit the owners in baseball, 
for example, from sharing the revenue in pretty much whatever 
 
143 See Jonathan C. Latimer, The NBA Salary Cap: Controlling Labor Costs Through 
Collective Bargaining, 44 CATH. U. L. REV. 205 (1994). 
144 See Joe Aquilar, New York Knicks 2001–02 Season Preview, SPORTS NETWORK, Oct. 
25, 2001. 
145 See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., A Proposal for the Antitrust Regulation of Professional 
Sports, 79 B.U. L. REV. 889, 906 (1999) (stating that New York is the largest market in 
the U.S., with over 14 million people); Top 50 Cities in the U.S. by Population and Rank, 
1990 and 2000, Info Please, at http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0763098.html (last 
visited Mar. 16, 2003) (listing the top five cities in the U.S., in terms of population, as 
New York, Los Angeles, Houston, Chicago, and Philadelphia, with Boston ranked at 
twentieth). 
146 See, e.g., Walter Adams & James W. Brock, Monopoly, Monopsony, and Vertical 
Collusion: Antitrust Policy and Professional Sports, 42 ANTITRUST BULL. 721 (1997) 
(stating that owners traditionally approve of competition between teams where it works in 
their financial favor and so long as they “receive their ‘fair’ share” of profits). 
147 See NFL-NFLPA CBA art. XXII, supra note 19; Peter N. Katz, Comment, A History 
of Free Agency in the United States and Great Britain: Who’s Leading the Charge?, 15 
COMP. LAB. L.J. 371, 381–84, 394–96 (1994). 
148 See, e.g., Brien C. Bell, Baseball’s Economic Woes, BUS. TODAY, Winter/Spring 
2002, at 12–13 (stating that revenue sharing without a salary cap is inflationary and 
ineffective), http://www.businesstoday.org/mag/2002spr/nation-baseball.pdf; Allen 
Barra, Bud Selig’s Forked Tongue, Salon, at http://archive.salon.com/news/sports/col/ 
barra/2001/12/14/selig/index1.html (Dec. 14, 2001). 
149 See Piraino, supra note 145, at 937–38 (arguing that there are “less restrictive 
alternatives” available to ensure competitive balance). 
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fashion they choose.150  And it really has nothing to do with the 
players.  The players do not control that.  If the owners really 
wanted to share revenue, they could.151 
They do not, however.  The George Steinbrenners, the large-
market teams, do not want to share revenue, so the game in 
baseball, and I have spent twenty-two years watching this 
negotiation game in baseball, is the so-called large-market 
owners.152  And it is really not the size of the market, it is the size 
of the revenue that the team generates, and that may have to do 
with the expertise of the people running the franchise.153  The 
large-revenue teams have interests that are antithetical to the small-
revenue teams, but they both choose to fight the players and try to 
paper over their grievances with one another.154  That is what 
happens in every single baseball negotiation. 
MR. FEHER: By the way, in terms of this parity issue, the 
salary cap does not really make a whole lot of sense in terms of 
promoting parity, if that is your only goal.155  The salary cap has a 
big effect on the owners’ bottom line in terms of why we thought 
the owners were looking for it.156  That is the only basis we ever 
believed. 
 
150 See RICHARD C. LEVIN ET AL., THE REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT MEMBERS OF THE 
COMMISSIONER’S BLUE RIBBON PANEL ON BASEBALL’S ECONOMICS (2000) (detailing the 
panel’s various recommendations for revenue sharing in baseball), http://www.mlb.com/ 
mlb/downloads/blue_ribbon.pdf. 
151 See, e.g., Stephen F. Ross, Light, Less-Filling, It’s Blue-Ribbon, 23 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1675, 1680 (2002) (stating that “any changes in revenue sharing will require the 
voluntary agreement of the owners or an extraordinary edict by the Commissioner under 
his newly granted powers”) (emphasis added). 
152 See Marc Topkin & Bill Adair, Amid MLB Woes, Rays Numbers Are Optimistic, ST. 
PETERSBURG TIMES (Fla.), Dec. 7, 2001, at 1C. 
153 See Eric Fisher, NFL Moving Toward Division of the Haves and Have-Nots, WASH. 
TIMES, Sept. 9, 2001, at C3. 
154 See, e.g., Christopher Carey, Cards Post $7.3 Million Loss, Report Says; DeWitt 
Says He’s Worried About Baseball’s Finances, ST. LOUIS DISPATCH, Dec. 7, 2001, at D1. 
155 See Ross, supra note 151, at 1697–99 (explaining why a blanket salary cap would be 
ineffective in creating parity among MLB franchises). 
156 See Christopher D. Cameron & Michael J. Echevarria, The Ploys of Summer: 
Antitrust, Industrial Distrust, and the Case Against a Salary Cap for Major League 
Baseball, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 827 (1995) (arguing that a salary cap in baseball would 
have little effect on competitive balance). 
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There are other very ready solutions to parity, one of which is 
actually in the NFL’s collective bargaining agreement, but that 
only applies in uncapped years.  Basically if a team wins the Super 
Bowl or is one of the final playoff teams, they cannot sign as many 
free agent players the next year.157 
So you can have very limited rules promoting parity that do not 
have an effect on the total wage bill.158  But the thing that the 
owners really want is to have rules that limit the total wage bill, 
which is usually what collective bargaining agreements are about, 
or what antitrust cases are about, in terms of employers trying to 
inhibit competition so that their total wage bill is lower. 
For example, there is a very common practice in the NFL, 
which does not get talked about very much, of signing a long-term 
contract with a big roster bonus that kicks in in a certain year, 
where both the player and the team know that when that year 
comes the player is not going to make it.159  The contract has a $6 
million roster bonus or something like that.  It says it is a six-year 
contract, for signing bonus pro ration reasons.  Because in the 
NFL, and I know this sounds complex, but the bonus is a form of 
guaranteed money.160  The players get their money upfront.161  So 
they get a big signing bonus, there is a six-year contract, but 
because it has a huge roster bonus that is payable at the beginning 
of the fourth year everyone knows the player is going to get cut at 
the beginning of the fourth year.162  So he gets his big paycheck 
upfront and it is really a three-year contract for all practical 
 
157 See NFL-NFLPA CBA art. XXI, supra note 19; Adam W. Heller, Creating a Win-
Win Situation Through Collective Bargaining: The NFL Salary Cap, 7 SPORTS L.J. 375 
(2000) (outlining the basic provisions of the NFL-NFLPA CBA). 
158 See David Thomas, Let’s Wear a Patriots Cap, EVENING STANDARD (London), Sept. 
10, 2002, at 81. 
159 See David J. Sipusic, Instant Replay: Upon Further Review, the National Football 
League’s Misguided Approach to the Signing Bonus Should Be Overturned, 8 SPORTS 
LAW. J. 207, 221, 239 n.233 (2001). 
160 Id. at 218–19. See also Ed Bouchette, Pittsburgh’s Heinz Field Helps NFL Team 
Stand Up to the Competition, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Aug. 24, 2001. 
161 See Bouchette, supra note 160. 
162 See Gary G. Roberts, Interpreting the NFL Player Contract, 3 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 
29, 33 (1992). 
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purposes.163  It is just a totally different structure that happens to be 
negotiated that way. 
In the NBA, the situation is different because you have 
guaranteed contracts.164  Some of this results from the fact that the 
sports are different in terms of the type of sports they are—the 
number of players, the length of careers, and from where the sports 
were coming.165 
From the players’ point of view, we do not think the current 
system is perfect by any means, and I am more than willing to take 
any idea you have that will not involve the continuation of the cap. 
MR. KRANE: Here we have the polarization of the sports law 
field coming full-tilt at you.  I have spent the last twenty years 
defending the legality and reasonableness of salary caps in various 
leagues.166  It is not exactly on our topic of conflicts of interest, 
and it is also a subject that we could debate for the next three days 
without finishing. 
But I will just say that, in defense of the leagues that do have 
caps, there is one fundamental question that you have to ask: If you 
are a professional athlete, are you going to take a “me first, I want 
as much money as I can get” attitude, or do you have a concern 
about there being a league at all ten years down the road?167 
 
163 See Scott McPhee, Comment, First Down, Goal to Go: Enforcing the NFL’s Salary 
Cap Using the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. 
L.J. 449, 468–72 (1997) (describing how NFL teams use signing bonuses even with 
salary cap restrictions). 
164 See Robert P. Garbarino, So You Want to Be a Sports Lawyer, or Is It a Player 
Agent, Player Representative, Sports Agent, Contract Advisor, Family Advisor or 
Contract Representative?, 1 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.F. 11, 37 (1994); Roberts, supra note 
162, at 32. 
165 See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 162, at 30–31; Sipusic, supra note 159, at 218–19. 
166 See, e.g., Fraser v. Major League Soccer, 284 F.3d 47 (1st Cir.) (holding that the 
teams comprising MLS do not violate antitrust laws in functioning as a single entity when 
negotiating employment contracts with players, thereby preventing players from 
negotiating contracts with individual teams and facilitating a hard salary cap), aff’d, 123 
S. Ct. 118 (2002); Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Williams, 45 F.3d 684 (2d Cir. 1995); 
Bridgeman v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 838 F. Supp. 172 (D.N.J. 1993). 
167 See, e.g., Roger Adams, Baseball: Safe at Home, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), Aug. 29, 
2002 (discussing recent tension in negotiations between baseball owners and players, 
during which the owners have expressed financial desperation). 
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MR. GRANTHAM: If I could make one point, and I do not 
represent a legal view, but strictly a business view.  It is very 
simple economics: If I own a team and I must revenue share, 
would I rather share with the players?168  If I share with the 
players, I will now have acquired a partner, and all partners then 
have financial certainty.169  As soon as you engage in this type of 
revenue sharing you have agreed to a cap on wages.170 
If you read The New York Times this past Sunday, Len 
Koppett, who is notably one of the best writers in sports, wrote a 
very interesting piece.171  It simply said that the owners in baseball 
are being unpatriotic, and they are being unpatriotic because they 
are not sharing this “thing” with us, this “thing” that somehow 
escapes all of us.172  Maybe Enron could have had that thing. 
Well, what is that thing?  That thing is the ability to have a 
business or be in a business for 148 years, like some of the baseball 
teams, or for the last three decades, and lose money, most recently 
$500 million, but still not go out of business, and at the same time 
increase your revenue by three-fold.  What is that secret?  
Whatever it is, if you are not sharing it, you are not being patriotic 
to our people.173  I rest my case. 
QUESTIONER: Is the structure of bargaining units and player 
representation and leagues and clubs similar or different in the 
minor leagues for those sports that have minor leagues, and are 
there conflicts between the parent club and the minor league club? 
 
168 See Dan Lewis, Look for the Union Label, National Review Online, at 
http://nationalreview.com/nrof_comment/comment-lewis080202.asp (Aug. 2, 2002) 
(discussing how revenue sharing among teams decreases the amount which teams can 
spend on players, thereby reducing salaries and creating a “cap”); Darren Rovell, 
Steinbrenner to File Antitrust Suit?, ESPN, at http://espn.go.com/mlb/s/2000/ 
0719/641139.html (July 21, 2000). 
169 See Lewis, supra note 168; Rovell, supra note 168. 
170 See Hal Bodley, Fehr Blasts Owner’s Proposals: Memo to Players, USA TODAY, 
Aug. 20, 2002, at 1C (discussing how a plan to adopt revenue sharing is a wholesale 
attack on salary structure and would result in big losses for big spenders, such as the New 
York Yankees); Lewis, supra note 168; Rovell, supra note 168. 
171 See Leonard Koppett, Backtalk: The Business of America’s National Pastime Is 
Unpatriotic Obfuscation, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2002, § 8, at 9. 
172 See id. 
173 See id.; Darren Rovell, Economists: Baseball’s Debts Misleading, ESPN, at 
http://espn.go.com.mlb/s/2000/0719/641339.html (July 21, 2002). 
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MR. FENECH: Let me answer that for baseball.  First of all, 
there is no bargaining unit for minor league baseball players.174  
They are the abandoned stepchildren of the sport.  That is point 
one. 
Secondly, the minor league clubs have a contractual 
relationship with the major league clubs.175  A few years back, the 
major league clubs saw that the minor league clubs were actually 
running a pretty profitable business, and they hammered them in 
the negotiation of their contract with the minor league clubs, so 
they now exist at the sufferance of the major league clubs.176 
You know, having an unregulated monopoly is a wonderful 
thing.177  My favorite line from John Helyar’s book, which I would 
recommend to all of you, called Lords of the Realm, was, and I 
cannot quote it exactly, Ted Turner is quoted as sitting in an 
owners’ meeting saying, “Guys, we have the only unregulated 
monopoly in America and you are still”—I’ll say screwing it up.178  
It is true.  It is absolutely true. 
So to answer your question, minor league players get the short 
end of the stick.  Minor league players earn $850 a month in their 
first contract year.179  One of the guys in my office showed me his 
father’s contract as a minor league baseball player, which would 
have been back in like 1960, and he earned $650 a month.  So that 
shows you how their wages have increased. 
QUESTIONER: I have two quick questions.  You said that if a 
lawyer is representing, and even acting as an agent, that they are 
 
174 See Michael Kinsman, Ballplayers Union Proves So Successful, SAN DIEGO UNION 
TRIB., Aug. 18, 2000, at H-2. 
175 See Lori Clark, The Evolution of Minor League Baseball, Western Michigan 
Whitecaps Captivations, at http://www.whitecaps-baseball.com/PRESSBOX/ 
FEATURE98/minors.html (July 3, 1998). 
176 See Clark, supra note 175; Bob Hoie, Minor League Farm Systems, En El Punto, at 
http://www.enel.net/beisbol/history/leagues/minors/farm.html (last visited Mar. 20, 
2003). 
177 See Major League Baseball v. Butterworth, 181 F. Supp. 2d 1316 (N.D. Fla. 2001) 
(noting that the business of baseball has been exempt from the antitrust laws since 1922); 
WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLINDER, ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES & POLICY 258–64 (7th 
ed. 1997); JOHN HELYAR, LORDS OF THE REALM: THE REAL HISTORY OF BASEBALL (1994). 
178 See HELYAR, supra note 177. 
179 See Hearing on S. 53 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary (1997) (statement of 
Dan Peltier), available at http://www.diamondfans.com/minors-peltier.html. 
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still held to the lawyer’s standards of ethics.180  What happens if 
there also is a lawyer involved on behalf of the player?  Does the 
standard change for that agent who also happens to be a lawyer? 
MR. KRANE: No.  If you are a lawyer, you are subject to the 
Code of Professional Responsibility or the Model Rules in all of 
your dealings with clients, and sometimes in your personal life.181  
Even when you are acting for yourself individually, there are some 
rules that apply to you as an individual.  So there is no escaping it.  
You sign on as a lawyer, you take the baggage.182 
QUESTIONER: My other question was for Craig.  I wondered 
if you could discuss any interesting merchandising conflicts of 
interest, as opposed to just conflicts arising in salary negotiations?  
For example, what if two players are looking to get on a cereal 
box? 
MR. FENECH: Okay.  Once again, though, the problem is that 
“Wheaties” usually makes that determination.  I would love to 
make it for them and you would see my clients on the Wheaties 
box right now. 
But I think that the point that was raised earlier, that there is the 
real world and then there is the world that we live in in law school.  
These conflicts come up and we sort of dance around and hope 
they do not arise.  But actually, we have an ethical obligation to 
see that they do arise, do we not, to see that they are spoken about 
and that people are made aware of them?183 
 
180 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(a) (2001); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L 
RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(a)(1) (2001). See also MODEL CODE OF PROF’L 
RESPONSIBILITY EC 1-5 (2001). 
181 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(a); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L 
RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(a)(1). See also MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 1-
5. 
182 See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl., § 4 (“A lawyer’s conduct should 
conform to the requirements of the law, both in professional service to clients and in the 
lawyer’s business and personal affairs.”). 
183 Clients may only consent to dual representation after full disclosure where a potential 
conflict of interest exists if an attorney has a “reasonable belief that the representation” of 
one client “will not adversely affect the relationship with the other client” or “be 
materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client,” and it is “obvious 
that he can adequately represent the interest of each.”  Otherwise, a conflict is 
unacceptable and cannot be waived, even through full disclosure and consent. MODEL 
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I think the concept of advance waivers flies right in the face of 
all that we have talked about here.  To me it is ludicrous to say, “I 
am going to represent the whole league and I am going to represent 
the individual teams.  You do not know what it is, but you are 
waiving it.”  It is absurd and it is a fiction. 
MR. KRANE: When you are dealing with sophisticated 
business-people, as we are with sports owners, who also have their 
own lawyers, they are at least beyond the age of consent and they 
know what they are doing. 
MR. FENECH: That is a long way from sophisticated. 
MR. KRANE: They know what they are doing.  They know 
what they are getting into.  It is different when you are dealing 
perhaps with individuals or with kids in college who are signing on 
with their first agent.  Maybe there it is something to think about. 
Ethics opinions on advance waivers make a distinction between 
the sophisticated business-person and the individual who may 
never have had an experience with a lawyer and has no advisors.184 
So you have to look carefully at each situation to see if it is 
really workable. 
QUESTIONER: One of the things that was interesting back in 
the 1980s, I will not name the Players Association person I spoke 
with, but when I first started seeing players being victimized by 
people who were giving financial advice, that lost them all their 
money, I asked if the Players Association could do something.  
They said, “We tried and then too many agents threatened to sue 
us.”  So they dropped the whole thing. 
What I find interesting is they spent all this time trying to 
ensure that players get the most amount of money possible on 
 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)–(b); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-
105(c). See also MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-16. 
184 See, e.g., New York County Lawyers’ Comm’n on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 724 (1998) 
(stating that a lawyer can seek an advance waiver with respect to future conflicts, and that 
the validity of the waiver will depend on the adequacy of disclosure given to the client 
under the circumstances, taking into account the sophistication and capacity of the person 
or entity giving the consent). 
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contracts, and then seem to be doing nothing until very recently to 
make sure that they try to retain that money.185 
With unions traditionally, you have pension funds that they 
invest their members’ monies in, and they have served as financial 
advisors, at least in that sense.186 
So I do not understand why you would think that giving some 
type of financial guidelines is not appropriate for a Players 
Association and why they would not want to start certifying, or at 
least giving strong guidelines for, investment counseling. 
MR. FEHER: On that, there are different buckets of money, so 
to speak.  If it is money within the collective bargaining agreement 
that is in the pension plan, that is subject to all the normal federal 
rules governing that.187  Those are monies received that are subject 
to the collective bargaining agreement.188 
What I was talking about is a little bit different, which is that, 
for example, if you are an auto worker, apart from your pension 
you also get say $1,000 in a given week as part of your paycheck.  
Then your union says, “You’re not allowed to go down to Charles 
Schwab because we have decided we are not going to certify 
Charles Schwab for this reason or that reason.”  That is money that 
the employees have gotten as salary which the employees as adults 
feel that they should decide as to how they are going to invest it 
personally. 
 
185 See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
186 See Employee Retirement Income Security Act [ERISA], 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 
(2000). 
187 See id. 
188 See DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT LAW GUIDE: LAWS, REGULATIONS, AND 
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE SERVICES, http://www.dol.gov/asp/programs/guide.htm (n.d.). 
[ERISA] requires persons and entities that manage and control plan funds to: 
manage plans for the exclusive benefit of participants and beneficiaries; carry 
out their duties in a prudent manner and refrain from conflict-of-interest 
transactions expressly prohibited by law; comply with limitations on certain 
plans’ investments in employer securities and properties; fund benefits in 
accordance with the law and plan rules; report and disclose information on the 
operations and financial condition of plans to the government and participants; 
and provide documents required in the conduct of investigations to ensure 
compliance with the law. 
Id. 
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The other thing is that unions are democracies, and whatever 
unions decide to do is, in general, driven by what the players 
themselves want.  And so quite often there are comments like, 
“Why doesn’t the union just do this because it is for the good of 
the players?” 
In the union leadership there are certainly very experienced 
people who know what is going on, and the leaders of the union 
have tended to be there over a number of years.189 
It is very, very difficult for a union to say, “Even though my 
members do not want this, I am going to force it on you in terms of 
what is going to happen with your personal paycheck.” 
This has been important enough of an issue for the NFLPA to 
implement this financial advisors program.190 
But, the program is voluntary.191  If one of the players does not 
want to deal with one of the registered financial advisors, he could 
take his money to his brother-in-law who is not registered, who 
says he should invest in some apartments or some options or 
whatever.  That is money that is in his pocket.  It is different. 
Even though this is a country that allows unions, this is still a 
country that does not allow unions, as far as I know, to tell 
employees what they can do or not do with their money once it 
gets in the employees’ pockets.   
QUESTIONER: My question involves the situation going on in 
baseball right now with the league actually owning a team.192  
Whose role is it now to police transactions with the Montreal 
 
189 See, e.g., Gene Upshaw, Info Please, at http://infoplease.com/ipsa/A0109717.html 
(last visited Mar. 20, 2003) (noting that Gene Upshaw, a former player with the Oakland 
Raiders, has been Executive Director of the NFLPA since 1987). 
190 Singletary, supra note 45 (explaining that in 2002, the NFLPA initiated a “Financial 
Advisors Program” to establish a code of conduct and check the backgrounds and 
credentials of those proffering services to protect NFL players from financial fraud). 
191 See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2000) (Employee representatives are empowered by the 
NLRA to bargain with employers concerning “rates of pay, wages, hours, or other 
conditions of employment,” but they are not empowered to instruct employees as to what 
to do with the wages that they receive.). 
192 Meg Vaillancourt, Sale of Marlins Clears Way for Close of Red Sox Sale, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Feb. 19, 2002, at D1 (noting that in February 2002, MLB purchased the 
financially troubled Montreal Expos from owner Jeffrey Loria for $120 million). 
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Expos, because that role is traditionally empowered to the 
Commissioner?193 
MR. FENECH: It is the Commissioner.  He has assumed that 
authority himself.194  He also owns the Brewers, although perhaps 
not technically.195  But their answer to that is it is in a blind trust.196  
I gather he cannot remember that he owns the Brewers.  I mean, it 
is laughable—talk about conflict of interest. 
QUESTIONER: In terms of what we have seen in the industry 
lately, the trend towards consolidation, other than building the 
screening wall,197 as SFX198 has done, what else can be done to 
avoid the conflict of interest?  And does creating a screening wall, 
destroy some of the synergies that you were potentially looking to 
achieve through consolidation? 
MR. FENECH: The screening wall is a joke, as many 
screening walls in fact are.199  It is a fiction.  It is like the blind 
trust that Bud Selig has with the Milwaukee Brewers.200 
 
193 See Jack O’Connell, Following His Lead; Selig Has Skippered Sport Through 
Changes, Strike, HARTFORD COURANT (Conn.), Mar. 31, 2002, at L2. 
194 See Gordon Edes, Caught Up in Spring; Here’s an Early Fan’s Guide to Everything 
Under the Sun, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 15, 2002, at E1. 
195 Bud Selig, Commissioner of MLB since 1998, has owned an interest in the 
Milwaukee Brewers since the 1970s.  When he became the interim Commissioner in 
1992, he created a blind trust run by his daughter, Wendy Selig-Prieb, to oversee the 
Brewers.  Nonetheless, Selig retains a financial interest in the club, an arrangement that 
has prompted conflict of interest criticism. See Tom Haudricourt, Conflict of Interest? 
Owners Want It That Way, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINENTAL, Jan. 13, 2002, at 13C; Ross 
Newhan, Budding Leader; Bud Selig, Who Used to Say He Didn’t Want to Be 
Commissioner, Is Expected to Be Near Unanimous Choice Today Because He’s a Known 
Quantity, L.A. TIMES, July 7, 1998, at C1; Ross Newhan, Selig Gets Commissioner’s 
Power, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1992, at C1. 
196 See Haudricourt, supra note 195. 
197 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 573 (7th ed. 1999) (A screening wall, also referred to as 
an ethical wall is “a screening mechanism that protects client confidences by preventing 
one or more lawyers within an organization from participating in any matter involving 
that client.”). 
198 Clear Channel Communications, About SFX, SFX, at http://sfx.com/publish_ 
static.asp?page=AboutSFX (last visited Mar. 25, 2003) (explaining that SFX, a 
subsidiary of Clear Channel Communications, is an agency representing professional 
athletes in baseball, basketball, football, hockey, tennis, and golf, and owning or 
operating approximately 130 live entertainment venues throughout the world). 
199 Id. See also David Greising, Chinese Wall No Great Defense Against Conflicts, CHI. 
TRIB., May 22, 2002, at B1. 
2 - PANEL II FORMAT 4/15/03  9:32 AM 
448 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 13: 405 
But the answer to your question is if there really was this 
separation, yes, it would destroy the synergies, although it seems to 
me that they have had a lot of problems in defining exactly what 
those synergies really are.  I mean, it is a nice word, but nobody 
knows what it means in practice. 
DEAN FEERICK: Steve, I have a question to you.  There are a 
lot of law students here.  Would you add any additional comments 
on screening walls? 
MR. KRANE: “Screens” are very controversial, highly 
controversial.201 
The American Bar Association (ABA) House of Delegates at 
its meeting two meetings ago, just within the last year, debated 
whether screens should be allowed in certain limited circumstances 
within law firms to wall off lawyers who at other firms had 
previously represented clients and now had come to a new firm 
that is going to be adverse to someone that they represented.202  
You screen them off so that they do not impart any confidential 
information that they learned from the old client.203  Is that good 
enough, without going to the former client and asking for a waiver, 
which is the standard?204 
That was hotly debated, and it went down to defeat, as it did in 
the New York State Bar Association House of Delegates when I 
was the proponent of it several years ago.205  So the legal 
profession is not too keen on having screens, even in large law 
firms, even to cure problems.206  Today screens are used primarily 
 
200 See Haudricourt, supra note 195. 
201 See Susan R. Martyn, Conflict About Conflicts: The Controversy Surrounding 
Screens, 46 OKLA. L. REV. 53 (1993). 
202 See Memorandum from Tom Edmonds, to the National Association of Bar 
Executives [NABE] (Aug. 10, 2001), http://www.abanet.org/nabe/deleg07.html. 
203 Greising, supra note 199. 
204 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2001); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L 
RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105 (2001); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-16, 5-
19 (2001). 
205 N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N SPECIAL COMM’N ON THE L. GOVERNING FIRM STRUCTURE 
AND ORG., PRESERVING THE CORE VALUES OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION: THE 
PLACE OF MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE IN THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS (2000), 
http://www.nysba.info/whatsnew/maccrate.pdf. 
206 See Martyn, supra note 201, at 53. 
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as an adjunct to consent, as a way of convincing a client that it is 
okay to waive a conflict because we will implement these 
procedures to make sure that your confidential information is 
preserved and that it does not leak over to the lawyers who are 
representing the other side.  So it is just a way of getting consent, 
not a substitute for consent.207 
MR. FEHER: And just as a follow-on to what you are saying, I 
think that with consolidation there are important things that can be 
bought.  You just have to be careful as to what you are buying, in 
the sense that if you buy somebody, buy an agency that represents 
a large number of players, if it is a stable agency that has a lot of 
goodwill with those players that is going to persist over time and 
you have confidence in them as businessmen, it is worth your 
money. 
If it is a situation where you do not know whether tomorrow 
those players are going to be somewhere else, you should be a little 
more careful as to what you are going to do with your money, 
because, as I said earlier in terms of what the underlying rules are, 
they allow for a lot more freedom of choice on the part of the 
players.208 
And so I am not saying do not buy them and that it’s not 
important and you cannot get synergies with your marketing 
efforts, because you can, but you just need to be sure that you 
invest in solid entities.  And I think that applies across the board. 
MR. FENECH: Well, I think that these discussions are helpful, 
and I think that guidelines are very important.  I usually see my 
role in these as being the guy who is sort of on the ground and, to 
quote Howard Cosell, tries to “tell it like it is.”209 
All of these considerations are very important, and the closer 
you can come to adhering to them perfectly the better off you are. 
 
207 See id. 
208 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16, cmt. 4 (“A client has a right to 
discharge a lawyer at any time, with or without cause, subject to liability for payment for 
the lawyer’s services.”); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-110(b)(4). 
209 See COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA 691 (6th ed. 2001) (noting that this was Howard 
Cosell’s mantra and an apt characterization of his approach to journalism). 
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I think everybody in the profession wants to see people playing 
by the rules.  The problem is the reality out there is far different 
than that, and I would caution you when you get out there, some 
people get a little carried away and think that it is the “Wild West,” 
and you can wind up getting burned, particularly if you are not 
somebody who has a lot of clout in the industry, which typically 
you won’t be in the beginning.  So be careful and adhere to these 
rules as best you can, but know that your competition probably is 
not.210 
MR. GRANTHAM: Just as a follow-up to answer the question 
with regard to unions and the advisory capacity with financial 
management, I would only say to you that unions are political 
units.  You may want something for the players, but it is what they 
want for themselves that ultimately rules at the end of the day. 
You may provide education as a union, however, with regard to 
financial advice, in particular, you must rely on trained 
professionals.  The labor law is very specific about what the union 
can do regarding the management of individual players’ money.211  
Negotiating their contracts and items in collective bargaining 
agreements is the union’s regulatory responsibility.  With regard to 
financial management, the union can only act in an advisory 
capacity. 212 
So it becomes political more so than anything at that point. 
DEAN FEERICK: Thank you. 
Steve? 
MR. KRANE: Well, I will just echo everything that everyone 
has said, except the denigrating comments on the salary cap and so 
on.  But really, just a reminder, in case you forget, that as lawyers, 
 
210 See Paul Ruschmann, Are Sports Agents Facing a Regulatory Blitz?, 65 MICH. BAR 
J. 1124 (1986), available at http://www.paulruschmann.com/clips/sports_law/sports_ 
blitz.htm. 
211 See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2000) (Employee representatives are empowered by the 
NLRA to bargain with employers concerning “rates of pay, wages, hours, or other 
conditions of employment,” but they are not empowered to instruct employees as to what 
to do with the wages that they receive.). 
212 See, e.g., Singletary, supra note 45 (explaining that in 2002, the NFLPA initiated a 
“Financial Advisors Program” to establish a code of conduct and check the backgrounds 
and credentials of those proffering services to protect NFL players from financial fraud). 
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your reputation is all you have, and it is very fragile.  The financial 
pressures in the competitive business environment we are in to get 
clients and to keep clients, are tremendous and sometimes push 
you pretty close to the line.  They will push you.  If you have not 
been pushed already, you will be pushed. 
Just when you reach the point that you think you are about to 
cross over the line, step back and think: Do I really want to risk 
everything I have worked for my entire career and throw it all 
away for a little bit of money or even a lot of money?  I think the 
answer should be no. 
I would just urge you to take the high road whenever you can 
and you will not be sorry. 
DEAN FEERICK: I am sure you will agree with me that was a 
great panel. 
Thank you very much. 
